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CAN RIGHTS MOVE LEFf? 
Jeremy Paul* 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY. By Jeremy Waldron. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. x, 470. $59. 
No one doubts that America's wealth is unevenly distributed. 
Figures from the most recent Statistical Abstract indicate that while 
roughly six percent of the country's households had a 1984 net worth 
of more than $250,000, a whopping twenty-six percent held $5000 or 
less.1 In the world's richest nation, over 32 million people live below 
the governmentally defined poverty level. 2 
Although these economic disparities would seem enough to pro-
voke immediate outrage, progressive critics face a familiar political 
roadblock. Economic inequality often appears to be a logical out-
growth of America's historic commitment to private property. After 
all, if vast resources are in private hands, how can we blame the state 
for private transactions that result in some hands holding more than 
others? And, if private property renders the State relatively powerless, 
how can citizens expect greater distributional equity than what has 
been or could reasonably be achieved through redistributive taxation? 
Such questions suggest a choice between private property on the one 
hand, and greater equality on the other. 
Moreover, this choice is more rhetorical than real. Given the other 
alternatives, it seems safe to say that most Americans want a private 
property system. Accordingly, politically meaningful debate now fo-
cuses more on narrow questions of taxation policy than on first princi-
ples of ownership. Does all this mean that people committed to 
greater economic equality are doomed to a ceaseless and futile assault 
'on the nation's most cherished economic principle? 
The short answer is no. Indeed, several strategies are available to 
confront the seeming conflict between private property and distribu-
tional equity. As a tactical matter, one approach is to concede the 
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competing tensions between property and equality and simply push 
hard on the equality side of the scale. One might note, for example, 
that since our system already includes redistributive taxation, it is im-
plausible to claim that redistribution is inconsistent with a private 
property regime. Moreover, since the correct level of taxation cannot 
possibly flow logically from the mere concept of property, the line sep-
arating permissible redistribution from impermissible confiscation will 
inevitably be the outcome of political debate. Accordingly, egalitari-
ans might engage in disputes over types and levels of taxation as a 
means of battling inequality without challenging the private property 
system or its seemingly unavoidable conflict with egalitarian 
aspirations. 
Two related difficulties, however, confront efforts to make redis-
tributive taxation the conceptual foundation of claims for more equal 
distributions of wealth. Initially, the mere presence of any redistribu-
tive taxation must itself be justified. Thus, to argue that there is no 
logical stopping point between some redistributive taxation and mas-
sive redistribution is to risk provoking a conservative backlash that 
concedes the point and demands an end to all redistribution. 3 More 
fundamentally, calls for a broadly redistributive tax may give away the 
game at the outset. Citizens may come to see the tax as an after-the-
fact exaction imposed on otherwise legitimate distributions of wealth 
and income. In other words, taxes will seem re distributional as op-
posed to part of the initial distribution of the nation's resources. In 
this context, although there may be no logical brake on egalitarian 
claims, powerful political coalitions will feel perfectly justified in fight-
ing redistribution that threatens to "take" their "legitimately" held 
property and give it to those who may need but do not deserve it. 
An alternative response to the claim that private property entails 
inequality might focus on the enormous ambiguity in the property 
concept. After all, property rights prototypically contain the right to 
exclude, the right to transfer, the right to bequeath, and even the right 
to destroy. Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to describe exactly 
when alteration or circumscription of these rights will destroy the es-
sence of a private property system, tremendous opportunities exist for 
government action that embraces broad notions of private property 
while simultaneously reflecting distributional concems.4 Proponents 
3. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 283-305 (1985) (arguing that the Constitution's protection of private property bars all 
redistributive taxes); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 168-70 (1974) (criticizing re-
distributive taxation as forced labor). But see Paul, Searching for the Status Quo, 7 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 743 (1986) (criticizing Epstein's argument). 
4. Nor must the legal system limit itself to distributional considerations after establishing a 
generalized property system. As Professor Singer has argued powerfully, distributional concerns, 
such as a desire to protect the more vulnerable party, are often built into the rules that establish 
property rights in the first instance. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 
611, 663-701 (1988). 
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of rent control, for example, frequently contend that, although the 
landlord as owner has the right to lease her property and receive a 
reasonable return,· she may not claim a property right to charge any 
rent she pleases. Indeed, the plausibility (if not the success) of institu-
tions like rent control may suggest that prerogatives of the wealthy are 
more vulnerable to contextual attack than to bold conceptual chal-
lenges to the hegemony of private property.5 
A bold challenge, however, is precisely what Professor Jeremy 
Waldron appears to have in mind. In his thoughtful, tightly reasoned 
book The Right to Private Property, Professor Waldron develops per-
haps the most powerful response to the claim that private property 
entails unlimited inequality. He denies it. Indeed, he goes further. 
Waldron argues that the strongest rights-based arguments supporting 
a private property system make sense otily if every citizen is assured a 
certain amount of property. Thus, Waldron concludes, private prop-
erty's most coherent supporters are those who take distributional con-
siderations deeply to heart. 
Waldron begins by locating his work within the rights tradition 
and explicitly disavowing any analysis of utilitarian claims that private 
property spurs economic growth (pp. 5-12). Thus, Waldron seeks to 
demonstrate that "there is no right-based argument to be found which 
provides an adequate justification for a society in which some people 
have lots of property and many have next to none" (p. 5). Accord-
ingly, the most interesting questions raised by The Right to Private 
Property involve Waldron's effort to reinvigorate the rights tradition as 
an ally of egalitarian goals. 
This task involves several intellectual hurdles. Most fundamen-
tally, Waldron must convince us of both the coherence and usefulness 
of the concept of rights and of the meaningful possibility of speaking 
of one right to private property as opposed to many different individ-
ual rights over resources, such as the right to use, the right to exclude, 
the right to transfer, and the like. From there, Waldron must proceed 
to persuade us of the deep-seated errors in conservative theories of 
property rights that base ownership on principles of acquisition and 
ignore distributional concerns. Finally, Waldron must demonstrate 
that his preferred rights-based approaches to property demand egalita-
rian conclusions and that a workable property system could in fact 
afford sufficient private control over resources to be called private 
while simultaneously containing the necessary limits on private trans-
actions to ensure relative distributional equity. 
5. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist seems persuaded that government has the power to regulate 
rents. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1988). In his words, the rent-control 
scheme upheld in Pennell "represents a rational attempt to accommodate the conflicting interests 
of protecting tenants from burdensome rent increases while at the same time ensuring that land-
lords are guaranteed a fair return on their investment." 485 U.S. at 13. 
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Wonderfully, Waldron forthrightly recognizes each of these chal-
lenges and explicitly confronts the difficult issues they raise. Better 
still, Waldron's arguments are everywhere intelligent and often highly 
persuasive. Indeed, nowhere is Waldron more convincing than in his 
critique of rights-based theories, such as Robert Nozick's, that profess 
to defend private property as a moral and ethical bar to governmental 
efforts to achieve even minimal distributional equity. 6 As a result, 
critics of rights-based theories have as much reason to study Wal-
dron's particular arguments as do those who are sympathetic to a 
rights approach. 
At root, however, Waldron seeks to do more than refute certain 
defenses of private property. Although he does not explicitly argue for 
private property (p. 443), Waldron offers the hope that rights-based 
property theory, rather than more skeptical or more radical traditions, 
holds the most promise for moving Western societies toward more 
equal distributions of wealth. Because Waldron so skillfully argues 
that a rights-based approach demands redress for the propertyless, his 
work poses a cogent challenge to those who would abandon the entire 
property rights tradition as inevitably linked to intellectual efforts to 
placate the powerful. 7 If Waldron is correct, progressive scholars 
might wish to soften their traditional hostility toward invocation of 
property rights. Accordingly, after canvassing Waldron's arguments,8 
this review will focus on Waldron's efforts to resuscitate rights-based 
theories of property. The review's conclusion is that although Wal-
dron presents a very clear and extraordinarily sophisticated analysis of 
property rights, 9 he fails to persuade progressive readers that his brand 
6. For Nozick's views, see R. NOZICK, supra note 3. 
7. See, e.g., Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 'fExAs L. REv. 1363, 1384-94 (1984) (arguing 
that rights talk may be harmful to "the party of humanity"); Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 'fExAs 
L. REV. 1417, 1422 (1984) (suggesting that the Left can resuscitate rights talk provided that 
rights are reconceptualized as something other than individual property). 
8. Because Waldron's arguments are so well done and because the book itself is lengthy and 
technical, considerable attention will be devoted here to sketching Waldron's views. This project 
necessarily involves a certain amount of oversimplification, but one glaring omission in this re-
view demands comment. A great deal of Waldron's book consists of painstakingly close textual 
analyses of Locke and Hegel as exemplars of contrasting property rights theories. These chapters 
alone constitute a considerable intellectual achievement, and a complete analysis of The Right to 
Private Property would contain some assessment of Waldron's success at capturing the essence of 
these theorists. Many readers, including this one, however, will accept Waldron's implicit invita-
tion to view the discussions of Locke and Hegel chiefly as building blocks in Waldron's more 
universal claim that rights-based arguments for private property produce relatively egalitarian 
conclusions. 
9. Despite its outstanding clarity, Waldron's book will not appeal to a wide audience oflaw-
yers or scholars. His approach is exhaustive and he tackles too many arcane points to maintain 
the interest of less than a devoted reader. Indeed, one noteworthy point in this regard is the 
book's lack of substantive footnotes. Although legal writing is often criticized for being footnote 
heavy, this reader found the requirement that every argument appear in text made it difficult to 
separate main points from minor ones. 
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of rights theory provides enough answers for those whose primary 
goal is redressing economic inequality. 
One additional point must be noted at the outset. For many read-
ers of The Right to Private Property, Professor Waldron's failure to 
consider utilitarian defenses of private property will constitute a fatal 
flaw. It is surprising, for example, that Waldron provides no response 
to the common view that private property is necessary to encourage 
talented individuals to work hard and thereby produce a larger social 
pie. 1° For if this common view is correct, a governmental focus on the 
distribution of wealth risks so undermining private initiative as to di-
minish the absolute shares of those at the bottom, even as the govern-
ment seeks to help them. Thus, a complete case against the 
inequalities within our private property system would have to include 
some analysis of the overall resource levels likely to be obtained under 
different property systems. Nor will it do simply to highlight the mas-
sive difficulties that proponents of trickle-down economics will face in 
demonstrating empirically how private property yields a larger social 
pie or why efforts to divide the pie more fairly will significantly dimin-
ish total resources. For precisely the same empirical difficulties will 
confront efforts to demonstrate that relatively egalitarian systems 
won't severely shrink total output. 
It would be unfair, however, to dismiss Waldron's work for failing 
to come to grips with consequentialist arguments about the role of 
private property in enhancing aggregate wealth. Waldron's explicit 
goal is to explore "whether there are any good right-based arguments 
for private property" (p. 3), and he means to distinguish rights-based 
arguments from the utilitarian tradition. Moreover, Waldron's work 
is more than sufficiently ambitious in its own terms. Finally, Waldron 
at least hints at his reasons for rejecting utilitarian theories (pp. 12-13). 
He suggests that utilitarian calculations too easily allow the gains of 
one person to compensate for the losses of another, even where the 
loser's suffering cannot be justified using separate criteria of justice. 
Moreover, he is suspicious of sophisticated forms of utilitarianism that 
seek to defend rule-following or individual rights on grounds of utility 
alone. Waldron doubts such theories can resolve the problem of un-
just trade-offs without abandoning utilitarian theory altogether. Ac-
cordingly, Waldron has candidly provided a road map for utilitarians 
who wish to take issue with his approach. This review leaves that 
utilitarian challenge to others. As noted above, the concern here is 
whether Waldron is persuasive on his own terms. In that regard, how-
ever, Waldron's inability to keep his focus on rights theory wholly sep-
10. That this view is common does not make it true. For a convincing demonstration that 
efficiency claims are heavily dependent on empirical assumptions and that under some conditions 
rational individuals might produce more in nonprivate property regimes, see Kennedy & 
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 717-20 (1980). 
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arate from utilitarian concerns will constitute a subtheme of this 
review. 
I. MOVING RIGHTS TO THE LEFT 
Professor Waldron's analysis of rights-based arguments for private 
property begins with the invaluable insight that private property's de-
fenders often confuse two distinct intellectual claims. One well-recog-
nized defense of private property, which Waldron explores through 
discussions of Locke and Nozick, bases the purported owner's claim 
on actions the owner has taken with respect to the resources over 
which she now claims ownership. To take the classic example, a 
farmer who encloses and cultivates previously unowned land may as-
sert a right to the land as a result of the actions she has taken and the 
labor she has invested. Waldron refers to arguments for a right to 
private property based on such contingent actions taken by the claim-
ant as special rights arguments.11 
A second type of argument on behalf of a right to private property 
focuses on the role property can play in facilitating some moral or 
developmental interests of the individual.12 Thus, an advocate of pri-
vate property might argue that people need property to form autono-
mous judgments without regard to economic dependence on others, to 
gain practical wisdom from bearing the consequences of choices con-
cerning the resources under one's control, or simply to assert more 
fully one's will over the material world.13 The crucial point about 
11. Pp. 115-17. For a useful analogy, Waldron asks that we consider the idea of contract 
rights. My right that you keep your promise to me arises only after you have engaged in the 
contingent event of making the promise. No promise, no contract right. Similarly, special rights 
arguments supporting a claim to own a specific resource arise only after the claimant has taken 
actions (analogous to the promise) concerning those resources. P. 109. 
12. In a fine chapter (pp. 284-322), Waldron considers a wide-ranging array of arguments for 
why human interests would be served by private property. He notes that priyate property might 
be defended as the best way to ensure the maximum liberty for each that is consistent with eq'ual 
liberty for all, and that private property might be singled out as a way of defending economic 
liberty as a primary liberty in accord with some hierarchical ranking. Pp. 290-98. He is most 
concerned, however, with arguments that private property is necessary so that an individual 
might develop into a truly ''free man." P. 298. (Waldron apologizes for sexist terminology in 
the acknowledgements. P. viii.). 
Waldron does not mean to focus here on the idea that people need material resources to 
survive. As he correctly notes, material resources can be provided by private, collective, or com-
mon property regimes. Pp. 351-52. Rather, Waldron is concerned with the role private property 
plays in moral and ethical development. Occasionally, however, he pushes this point too far and 
the reader wonders whether it is fair to belittle "the familiar banality that it is a mockery to offer 
civil and political freedom to a starving man" while embracing the assertedly more profound 
point "that being a free man positively requires some degree of material security, since without it 
one would never have the opportunity to exercise the reflection, restraint, and control that consti-
tutes an autonomous life." P. 306. 
13. Waldron's chapter canvassing these arguments and others thoroughly debunks a com-
mon misconception. He notes that people often talk as though defenders of private property are 
logically committed to a limited government that protects only the citizens' so-called "negative 
liberty" to be free from external restraints. On this misguided view, once the government ac-
knowledges that economic dependence threatens liberty almost as severely as more traditional 
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these arguments is that they rely not on the already completed actions 
of any individual but rather on the mere status of personhood.14 Wal-
dron refers to them as general rights arguments. 
Waldron uses the distinction between special rights and general 
rights arguments as the fulcrum for his distributional concerns (p. 
117). As an initial matter, he favors general rights arguments for pri-
vate property because they suggest private property is worth defending 
even if no citizens have taken any specific actions, such as appropria-
tion, that would give rise to property claims (pp. 284-90). More im-
portant, Waldron illustrates how arguments that property serves an 
individual's moral interest push in the direction of affording property 
to every individual so as to satisfy that moral interest. While special 
rights arguments may suggest that citizens who have not performed 
the required acquisitive actions (the nonindustrious?) deserve no prop-
erty, general rights arguments appear coherent only as they assert why 
everyone needs private property. After all, if I need private property 
to develop into a moral being, presumably, so do you. Accordingly, 
Waldron's attempt to demonstrate the egalitarian component of the 
property right hinges on his preference for general rights arguments. 
A. The Negative Case 
Because Waldron concedes that a successful special rights argu-
ment on behalf of private property might lead to a defense of massive 
inequality, Waldron's first task is to explain why special rights argu-
ments for property cannot succeed.15 What makes this portion of his 
book so interesting is that Waldron's own commitment to rights-based 
arguments prevents him from resorting to more skeptical criticisms of 
rights-based arguments for private property. Thus, in the absence of 
divine revelation, one problem with special rights arguments is that 
the special rights proponent appears to have invented the right and is 
forms of coercion, then the government must abandon private property in favor of collective or 
socialist systems. As Waldron correctly notes, however, some ideas of positive liberty, such as 
the idea that people need private property to develop into "free" ethical beings, support private 
property notions. Waldron later acknowledges that it may not be possible to maintain a private 
property system, including free transfer of resources, that will not eventually result in some citi-
zens being so impoverished as to be left with nothing but negative liberty. He is right, however, 
that liberal rights theorists are free to make the case for private property even while admitting 
that economic domination risks undermining the very goals private property is established to 
advance. 
14. For the pathbreaking exploration of how current property law does and should recognize 
property's contribution to personhood, see Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. RBv. 
957 (1982). 
15. Waldron carefully distinguishes between special rights theories like Locke's, which are 
qualified by a more general right to material resources necessary for subsistence, and special 
rights theories like Nozick's, which are more weakly qualified. Waldron challenges Locke for 
failing to draw an adequate connection between an individual's labor and his claim to ownership, 
but Waldron acknowledges that some theory like Locke's might someday succeed. His true 
target is more Nozickian theories that have strong anti-egalitarian consequences. His critique of 
those theories is pursued in the text. 
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vulnerable to the claim that she has merely attached the rights label to 
her own view of political organization.16 This challenge does not cap-
ture Waldron's attention, however, for he seems quite comfortable 
with the idea that the proponent's arguments in favor of a special right 
should stand and fall on the merits. The question, in Waldron's view, 
is whether the rights proponent can present a cogent argument that a 
particular interest of an individual is sufficiently important that others 
are under a duty to respect it.17 Accordingly, Waldron does not criti-
cize special rights arguments on the grounds that rights theory is un-
able to confront the obvious questions of where rights come from, who 
defines them, and how they will be enforced. Waldron is instead un-
happy with the answers special rights arguments provide. 
The chief weakness of special rights arguments for private prop-
erty, Waldron contends, is that there is no easy way to explain why the 
unilateral actions of one individual should impose duties on others 
(pp. 253-83). Waldron correctly notes that ownership claims cannot 
be limited to claims about the owner's relationship to the owned ob-.· 
ject. Rather, ownership entails the further claim that other persons 
must not interfere with the owner's use of the object (p. 267). But 
how, Waldron asks, can actions I take in appropriating an object im-
pose duties on others to refrain from using it, particularly if they need 
that object to fulfill their own moral duties, such as feeding their fami-
lies (p. 268)? More generally, Waldron wonders, how can we justify 
the state coercion necessary to enforce special rights-based property 
rights when propertyless citizens have not actually consented to spe-
16. Similarly, special rights arguments could be criticized for granting the special rights pro-
ponent the power of defining the scope of rights she herself has invented. 
17. Pp. 84-90. Waldron's view here raises a deep methodological problem. For it is fair to 
ask what sort of arguments could possibly justify the claini that a person has a right to anything. 
If, for example, one seeks to justify a right to property for appropriators of unclainied land, one 
argument might be that the economy will perform better when the state recognizes and rewards 
individual effort. But, as Waldron acknowledges (p. 202), this sort of argument risks blurring 
rights·talk with utilitarianism because the rights proponent must defend private property with 
consequentialist arguments even as she disavows consequentialism as the root of her political 
theory. Alternatively, an advocate of a right to private property might assert that one who has 
labored on unowned land should have a right to keep the land because she deserves it. But this 
approach simply pushes the question back, leaving it for the rights theorist to explain why the 
laborer deserves the land or more generally to find a source for claims of moral desert that is 
neither religious (and thus outside the bounds of secular debate) nor consequentialist (and thus 
ultimately utilitarian in its outlook). 
As noted in the text, Waldron seeks to buttress his rights analysis against this collapse into 
other forms of reasoning by asking the reader to consider only whether the asserted right corre-
sponds to an interest of the individual strong enough that others should be under a duty to 
respect it. P. 87. One problem here is that there is no ready scale on which to measure the 
strength of interests, thus there is always the danger of sliding into consequentialist phrases like 
"his interest is strong enough to be a right because everyone would be better off if we treated it 
that way." Ultimately, however, the real question for Waldron's rights approach is whether he 
can explain what it means for an individual's interest to become strong enough to earn the 
designation of individual right. In other words, when will my needing something like free speech 
become an obligation upon others to either provide me a chance to speak or at least not obstruct 
my efforts? See infra Section II.A. 
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cial rights property rules and hypothetical citizens forming a state 
would be reluctant to agree to rules that could result in their being 
morally and legally bound to starve rather than take what their neigh-
bors have appropriated?18 
Waldron's points here are well taken. As he correctly maintains, 
special rights arguments for private property differ from a special 
rights approach to contract law (p. 267). In contracts, a person can 
arguably become obligated to perform a promise as a result of the con-
tingent action of promising. But, in contracts, the act of promising 
binds the promisor so that she arguably created her own obligation. 
In contrast, the special rights approach demands that the contingent 
actions of the appropriator or creator alone prohibit others from using 
the claimed resource. Waldron is right that such a result confounds 
our typical moral notions of individual obligation.19 
18. Waldron's question here builds on John Rawls' classic work A Theory of Justice, J. 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JurncE (1971). See pp. 271-78 (explicitly relying on Rawls). Like 
Rawls, Waldron argues that one crucial component in assessing the validity of a political theory 
(here a theory of property rights) is the extent to which those who might agree to the theory 
without regard to its impact on their particular circumstances will be able to adhere to the theory 
once faced with its adverse effects. This is certainly a legitimate question. 
Waldron's resort to the contractarian tradition, however, raises doubts about the nature of 
his commitment to the rights approach endorsed throughout the book. Since Waldron stresses 
that every theory has foundational aspects from which its other conclusions may be derived (p. 
64), the reader wonders whether Waldron's arguments for rights are indeed foundational or 
whether Waldron's real test for validity is whether a particular notion of property can be justified 
within the Rawlsian framework of hypothetical social contract. See generally R. UNGER, THE 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 13 (1986) (noting ways in which rights theorists often 
vacillate' between rights-based and consensus-based justifications). 
Waldron may believe that such a substantial overlap exists here as to create few problems. 
After all, Rawls argues strenuously for a theory of justice that recognizes the primacy of individ-
ual political rights. J. RAWLS, supra, 228-34, 541-48. But as Waldron recognizes later in the 
book (pp. 398-408), rights theorists like Nozick fear that Rawlsian analysis may eviscerate rights 
by failing to recognize that certain rights, such as the right to one's body, should be outside 
collective debate. Waldron skillfully demonstrates that the specter of forced kidney transplants 
(from old to young?) does nothing to support a property right to external resources. Establishing 
a cooperative regime that limits one's ability to exercise talents so as to gamer personal wealth 
hardly amounts to coercive dissection. But Nozick's deeper point involves the difficulty of hold· 
ing on to the primacy of individual concerns when the evaluative standard is the hypothetical 
agreement of every member of the collective. Cf. Stick, Turning Rawls Into Nozick and Back 
Again, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 363, 377 (1987) (wondering why hypothetical citizens discussing 
property rights in a Rawlsian original position couldn't read Nozick's book and appreciate its 
merits). Why, in other words, doesn't contractarian analysis offer the supposed contracting par-
ties the possibility of agreeing to measure gains to some against losses to others in ways similar to 
those that lead Waldron to reject utilitarianism? 
19. The case of the father's care and concern creating a duty on his child to honor him 
perhaps suggests we have some familiarity with obligations not engendered by individual action. 
Waldron rightly assumes, however, that traditional rights theory contemplates application to a 
broad array of arms-length transactions outside the familial context. But cf. R. DWORKIN, 
LAW'S EMPIRE 195-202 (1986) (discussing ways in which people might acquire obligations be-
cause of their role as members in a community rather than as a result of individual actions on 
their part). Moreover, special rights arguments for property unqualified by more general rules 
guaranteeing minimal income appear to allow property-holding members of the community to 
exclude the propertyless from crucial material resources. It is difficult to imagine why the prop• 
ertyless would wish to enter into such a community much less how community obligations could 
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Moreover, Waldron also correctly highlights problems with con-
tractarian justifications of special rights arguments based on principles 
of acquisition. One familiar co~dition of a political theory based on a 
hypothetical social ·contract is that the parties who supposedly enter 
into this contract care deeply about their ability to comply with it for 
reasons other than fear of being caught cheating. But a social contract 
that incorporates special rights-based property rules may demand that 
the parties who fail to engage in the actions necessary to acquire prop-
erty respect the property rights of others even if this means starving to 
death. Since people might never reasonably be expected to comply 
with a property system ,that compels their extinction, Waldron con-
cludes, there is no basis to accept any special rights property system 
that puts rights gained through actions like appropriation or labor 
ahead of material need. 20 We might still wish to consider a theory of 
special rights property rights qualified by a more general right to ma-
terial resources necessary for a minimal existence, but such theories 
would support rather than refute Waldron's underlying claims.21 
Rights-based arguments for private property, he argues, cannot sup-
port property as a bar to more basic goals of distributive justice. 
Those who believe otherwise will have no choice but to confront Wal-
dron's well-reasoned views. 
somehow give rise to a duty to respect property acquired by the unilateral actions specified in the 
special rights theory. · 
20. Perhaps because of his hostility to utilitarianism, Waldron never convincingly explains 
why parties to his hypothetical contract might not find the total economic gains from a private 
property system so great as to warrant adopting a system that risks placing a few propertyless 
citizens in a position where they could not reasonably be expected to obey the law. The con-
tracting parties might then assume that the state's coercive sanctions will fill the role left open by 
the more desirable voluntary compliance. There would, of course, be costs to abandoning the 
moral clarity of a system where no one is purposefully relegated to the role of outlaw. But 
Waldron's own commitment to measuring costs and benefits only when assessing the justification 
of a particular individual right renders it virtually impossible to compare the costs of a less 
elegant political system against the costs of a property system that might produce a smaller pie. 
21. The possibility of qualifications to the special rights-based theory that would permit ex-
ceptions for those in need greatly complicates the topic here. As Waldron recognizes, a special 
rights theory might escape his criticism if it refused to permit acquisition of unowned resources 
in ways that would bind the propertyless to respect others property rights at the expense of their 
own survival. But Waldron insists that the exception here must be a strong one that "never'.' 
authorizes property rights to bar the claims of those in need. P. 281. A more absolute special 
rights theory must fail, Waldron contends, because it could not command the allegiance of those 
expected to obey it. Accordingly, Waldron concludes that a special rights theory might satisfy 
his concerns if it contained the proviso traditionally (although Waldron believes incorrectly) 
attributed to Locke that would prohibit appropriation of unowned resources unless there were 
"enough and as good" resources left over. So too would a special rights theory made subservient 
to a general right to material resources necessary for subsistence. In contrast, Waldron rejects 
Nozick's more limited conception in which acquisition would be forbidden only when the appro-
priation left others in a worsened condition as a result of losing the chance to use the appropri-
ated resources and only after taking into account indirect benefits of an appropriative system. 
Pp. 280-81. 
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B. The Affirmative Case 
Having completed his case against special rights arguments, Wal-
dron turns to the considerably more difficult tasks pf exploring general 
rights-based arguments for private property, suggesting how they 
might succeed, and illustrating their substantially egalitarian compo-
nents. He suggests, for example, that people might be more indepen-
dent with private property and that private property might encourage 
people to develop the prudence necessary to care for their own re-
sources. Although it would be difficult wholly to refute these possible 
advantages, the important question is whether the obvious gains from 
individualized control over certain parts of the material world justify 
adopting a political system in which individuals have a right to some-
thing called private property. 
1. Defining Private Property 
Waldron deserves significant credit for taking very seriously the 
burden of justifying his preference for rights-talk and his defense of 
private property. More important, he offers intriguing suggestions 
around conventional objections. Consider first the familiar possibility 
that private property is too ambiguous a concept upon which to build 
a political theory. Suppose, for example, that the legal system gives 
me the right to ride a particular horse and to exclude you from doing 
so, but does not permit me to transfer that right to anyone else. Do I 
own the horse? If the answer is an unqualified yes, then the right to 
transfer has been disaggregated from the traditional bundle of prop-
erty rights, and even the successful defense of this disaggregated pri-
vate property system would fail to justify the majority of our current 
practices involving private control over material resources.22 
There are problems too, however, with an unqualified no. Wal-
dron and many serious thinkers wish to avoid the sort of conceptual-
ism that would link private ownership to a single list of designated 
attributes.23 After all, can we really say, for example, that an alloca-
tion system that permits unlimited bequests differs so greatly from one 
that forbids bequests above a certain amount that only the former de-
serves to be called a private property system? If not, and if the unlim-
ited right to bequeath is not essential to private property, what is? 
Indeed, perhaps it makes no sense to talk about private property at all. 
Maybe greater understanding would be achieved if lawyers concen-
trated only on the different rights often associated with private prop-
22. For an explanation of how proliferating definitio.ns of property challenge property's role 
as an ideological linchpin in defenses of and attacks on contemporary capitalism, see Grey, The 
Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69-82 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 
1980). 
23. P. 30. See generally Radin, The Consequences of Conceptua/ism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 
239 (1986) (exploring weaknesses of conceptualism within Richard Epstein's property theory). 
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erty, e.g., the right to exclude, the right to transfer, and so on, without 
attempting to combine them into a single "private property" 
package.24 
The trick then for proponents of private property is to explain how 
the various rights private property might be thought to entail can be 
accumulated into a meaningful concept of property without having to 
defend the idea that there is only one bundle of rights consistent with a 
private property system. Waldron does this rather nicely. He argues 
first that people need the broad contrast between private property, col-
lective property, and common property as a method for organizing 
their understanding of day-to-day life. It is unrealistic, he suggests, to 
expect ordinary citizens to master a whole set of detailed rules con-
cerning control over resources without reference to a single "organiz-
ing idea" such as private property.25 Moreover, "organizing ideas" 
are more likely to be a focal point for the societal consensus necessary 
to legitimate the legal system (p. 43). On this view, it is plausible to 
describe citizens as endorsing private property as a general idea, but 
implausible to expect agreement on each of its constituent parts. Ac-
cordingly, Waldron sees a vital role for the idea of private property in 
political discussion. 
At the same time, however, Waldron carefully stresses the difficul-
ties of identifying a single list of factors that would form necessary and 
sufficient conditions for private ownership (p. 30). He wants to say 
that systems that allow bequests and systems that don't could both be 
fairly characterized as private property systems. To do this, he bor-
rows and adapts the distinction between a concept of private property 
and various conceptions of private property falling within the con.:. 
cept. 26 The idea here is that people can discuss questions of allocation 
of resources at a level of abstraction at which they all agree to be com-
paring private property systems with other broad general concepts 
such as common or collective property. This is so even if the discus-
sion's participants cannot agree on precisely which characteristics 
mark out a private property system. Thus, there might be agreement 
about the meaningfulness of the concept of private property even if 
there is disagreement over the, details, or as Waldron would put it, 
24. See Grey, supra note 22, at 73 ("It seems fair to conclude from a glance at the range of 
current usages that the specialists who design and manipulate the legal structures of the ad-
vanced capitalist economies could easily do without using the term 'property' at all."). 
25. Pp. 42-43. Waldron builds here on Bruce Ackerman's contrast between social property 
- ownership claims that can be easily defended as consistent with social practice - and legal 
property - ownership claims whose validity frequently must be established by lawyers. B. ACK-
ERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 116-18, 156-67 (1977). 
26. Pp. 52-53. For earlier uses of the concept/conception distinction, see J. RAWLS, supra 
note 18, at 5-11 (competing conceptions of justice); R. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 70-71 (com-
peting conceptions of courtesy). Waldron fully acknowledges his debt to Rawls and Dworkin. 
P. 52. 
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even if there are competing conceptions of private pI'operty.27 Ac-
cordingly, Waldron concludes, private property is a coherent concept 
that can resist efforts to break it into its component parts but is not a 
uniform concept that prohibits disagreement over concrete issues in-
volving the allocation of resources. 
Although Waldron's balancing act here works well as a vehicle for 
focusing attention away from definitional disputes and toward the rea-
sons why individuals should or should not control material resources, 
the risks of relying on some collective understanding of private prop-
erty should not be overlooked. Waldron is probably correct when he 
relies on the human psychological tendency to "organize" affairs 
through a few general principles rather than to memorize a set of sub-
rules. Even here, though, the reader wonders whether Waldron hasn't 
resorted to a consequentialist point to support his conclusion. For 
presumably the need to respect underlying cognitive structures stems 
from some notion that this will improve collective organization.28 
But, if consequentialism runs so deep as to structure our decisions on 
which concepts are true (Le., those that appeal to our need for an "or-
ganizing idea"), can we really avoid consequentialist evaluations of 
property systems based on their effects on overall wealth? 
More important, one wonders whether private property is a func-
tioning or a desirable organizing idea. 29 There does seem to be some-
27. It is tricky to see how the parties might agree on the concept of private property but not 
be able to specify its component parts. They .:night instead simply agree to omit the disputed 
aspects, such as the right to bequeath, but coalesce around core attributes of private property like 
the right to exclude. But, following Wittgenstein, Waldron fairly reminds us that humans often 
have the ability to identify "family resemblances" without relying on a set of uniform character-
istics. Waldron's colorful example points out that we might easily recognize a particular member 
of the Churchill family to have a Churchill face even if she lacks the Churchillian Roman nose. 
P. 50. 
28. It would be possible for Waldron to defend his reliance upon psychological principles by 
claiming to be describing reality and denying the need to appeal to normative principles that 
transcend description. Nothing in his book, however, suggests a desire to blur the traditional 
distinction between descriptive and prescriptive reasoning. For recent efforts to use cognitive 
theory to challenge that distinction, see Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. 
L. REv. 639 (1990), and works cited therein. 
29. It is intriguing that Waldron's notion of an "organizing idea" turns the discussion away 
from the idea of justification that otherwise forms the central preoccupation of his book. Don't 
citizens who use private property as an "organizing idea" need to know not only who owns what 
but why they own it? If so, then the idea of private property as such may be too abstract to 
constitute a viable organizing idea. 
Moreover, even if one accepts, as Waldron argues, that there may be a strong general rights 
argument on behalf of private property, that argument will say little about the content of the 
property rules. It may, as Waldron suggests, point away from rules that give a lot to some and 
virtually nothing to others. But general rights arguments do not clearly connect up specific 
individuals with specific goods. Rather, they support the view that once ownership rules are 
established, courts should protect them against neighborly and governmental intrusion. Perhaps 
this is why property's defenders have a tendency to adopt special rights arguments that would 
award first possessors an interest in what they have appropriated. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra 
note 3, at 217. Waldron is right that such arguments are different in character from the general 
rights arguments he wishes to defend. But maybe this means that as it now stands people really 
believe in conflicting justifications of private property and that the concept is in fact a poor 
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thing slightly patronizing about the argument that although those who 
have thought seriously about property see problems in rendering the 
concept coherent, we nonetheless need to hold on to the idea of private 
property to satisfy the limited conceptual abilities of the ordinary citi-
zen. Moreover, isn't it extraordinarily likely that people permitted to 
fend off complexity by citing a need for an "organizing idea" will also 
latch on to the kind of conceptualism that Waldron's own work strug-
gles creditably against? Indeed, those skeptical about defining private 
property have reason to fear that the psychological need for a simpli-
fied organizing idea will allow the idea of private property to serve 
precisely the ideological agenda Waldron sets out to challenge. Wal-
dron says little about why people's cognitive need for simplifying prin-
ciples won't push them toward the unjustified view that law's role is to 
define and defend a single set of rights constituting the property sys-
tem. Nor does he allay our fears that the set of rights people will settle 
on will just happen to be that which protects the rich against govern-
ment focus on fair distributions of wealth. 
Waldron hopes instead to defeat conservative ideology by defining 
private property broadly enough to include many different views on 
distributional questions. But there are problems too in avoiding efforts 
to disaggregate the property concept through use of the concept/con-
ception distinction. The distinction depends upon carefully separating 
the points of agreement (on the concept) from the points of disagree-
ment (competing conceptions). In specifying the grounds of agree-
ment, however, the author of the distinction risks foreclosing 
alternative points of view by defining them out of the game. Suppose, 
for example, that one person believes the right to exclude is at the core 
of private property so that any system that failed to include this would 
not really be a private property system. Another might find this view 
nonsense, pointing to the existence of cases in American law where 
owners are forced to permit others onto their land. 30 Do these dispu-
tants still share a concept of private property such that they are merely 
arguing over competing conceptions? If not, then the defender, let's 
say, of the right to exclude, risks using her definition of private prop-
erty as a way of cutting off debate about the rules concerning 
exclusion.31 
"organizing idea." See Paul, supra note 3. For further work on the idea that current property 
law in fact reflects allegiance to two different concepts of property, see J. Paul, The Hidden 
Structure of Takings Law (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
30. See. e.g., State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971) (finding that trespass laws do 
not forbid health and legal professionals from entering a private farm, over the owner's objec-
tions, to render aid to migrant workers); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980) (rejecting federal "takings" challenge to California court decision that its state constitu-
tion's free speech guarantees required shopping center owners to grant access to students gather-
ing petition signatures). 
31. Waldron recognizes this in a similar discussion concerning the right to bequeath. Pp. 50-
51. 
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But if both parties do share a concept of property, then the concept 
must be pushed to a still more abstract level, as Waldron does when he 
suggests that a private property system necessarily entails little more 
than a scheme whereby individuals have the final say over what is 
done with certain material resources. 32 This level of abstraction, how-
ever, contains further risks. Even when resources are collectively or 
commonly owned, for example, there will be designated individuals 
who have final say over who can use a particular resource. Consider , 
the lifeguard who decides where beachgoers may swim. Thus, as Wal-
dron recognizes, more communal systems will also contain subrules 
about who can use what resources and when (p. 41). 
It is tricky, however, to distinguish these subrules from the prop-
erty rules in a private property system. Waldron presumably would 
concede that people in a private property system have "final" say over 
use of resources only because the collective has adopted a private 
property system. 33 Thus, private property systems are faced with the 
inevitable task of both inventing and changing the property rules. 
Similarly, even collectivist regimes have no choice but to assign some 
decisionmaking authority to individuals (imagine a plebiscite on 
whether I can eat an apple for lunch today). Accordingly, the real 
debate might best be described as over which types of delegations are 
desirable rather than over which organizing principle the society 
adopts. Waldron is surely right that people now prefer first to settle 
the seemingly broader issue of the society's general orientation, but 
this may be a cultural artifact rather than a way of advancing 
32. P. 39. Waldron states that "[i]n a private property system, a rule is laid down that, in the 
case of each object, the individual person whose name is attached to that object is to determine 
how the object shall be used and by whom." P. 39. This definition, of course, does not settle 
matters such as whether my decision to give you something on condition you use it in certain 
ways leaves the object with no clear individual owner and thus no longer a subject of private 
property. See Grey, supra note 22, at 70. 
Waldron does address, however, the obvious problem that no system of law could ever give 
individuals final say over how resources are used. I might be said to own my car, for example, 
but no one would stiggest that I can use it to run you down. Waldron contepds the rules protect-
ing pedestrians are more appropriately classed as rules of conduct rather than property rules. As 
he puts it, "The specific function of property rules is to determine, once we have established that 
bicycles may be ridden, who is entitled to ride which bicycle when." P. 33. One classic property 
issue, however, seems to be whether I can ride my bicycle across your land. See Preseault v. 
Interstate Commerce Commn., 110 S. Ct. 914 (1990) (refusing to entertain claim by holders of. 
reversionary interest that government unconstitutionally took their property by authorizing use 
of railroad rights of way for recreational trails). Indeed, property law has no choice but to 
grapple not only with who will decide how resources are used but with what decisions people 
may make. Moreover, the disputed issues Waldron considers, such as whether an owner may 
transfer a resource, appear to involve rules of conduct rather than allocational decisions. It is 
unclear then whether Waldron's abstract definition marks out a concept of private property with 
sufficient completeness for the reader to identify private property as a functioning system to 
contrast with other approaches. 
33. Although Waldron defends individual rights, he does not describe these rights as natural 
or preexisting the state. Accordingly, his willingness to accept the burden of justifying rights 
from the perspective of winning collective agreement compels him to defend private property as a 
collective invention. 
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discussion. 34 
At root, the combination of the "organizing idea" defense of a con-
cept of private property with the concept/conception distinction 
threatens to overlook the main point of those who argue that private 
property tends to break down into a series of rights rather than stand-
ing as an overarching principle. Definitional skeptics contend that pri-
vate property works as an "organizing idea" precisely because it relies 
on a particular conception of property. Waldron readily acknowl-
edges, for example, that private property would not work as an "or-
ganizing idea," if ownership meant you could keep things you 
purchased and were given to you, unless someone else showed a 
greater need for them. But how can we decide whether such a system 
would still be a private property system (hence within the concept as a 
competing conception) or outside private property (perhaps because 
the rules concerning neediness were now the true allocational guide-
lines)? If such a system is a private property regime, the arguments 
for it might be expected to look different from those presently ad-
vanced to defend contemporary private property systems. Indeed, the 
instability of such a system would threaten even a general rights argu-
ment stressing a person's need for control over resources. But if such 
a system falls outside the concept of private property then certain sub-
stantive views have been smuggled into the concept in a way that risks 
foreclosing political debate. 
In sum, one strength of Waldron's book is the extent to which he 
tackles definitional skepticism directly. He brings a clear, fresh de-
scription to the problem, and retains confidence that we can draw 
strength from traditionally plain talk. At the same time, Waldron is 
aware of complexity and indeed contributes to our understanding of 
it. 35 The Right to Private Property, however, will not put an end to the 
debate over whether private property is an intellectually as opposed to 
rhetorically meaningful concept. One hopes Professor Waldron will 
have more to say on the subject. 
2. The General Rights Approach 
After confronting the dilemmas in defining property, Waldron's re-
maining task is to tame the beasts lurking in the thicket of rights anal-
ysis. 36 The questions are familiar. What does it mean to say a person 
has a right to something? How do rights-based arguments differ from 
other forms of political argument? Can rights conflict and what hap-
34. For the view that contemporary commitment to a general concept of private property 
results from private property's role in the ideological and practical escape from feudalism, see 
Grey, supra note 22, at 73-74. 
35. Waldron's discussion beginning at page 26 would be a welcome addition to any set of 
materials introducing the idea of property to first-year law students. 
36. See generally Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62 TEXAS L. R.E.v. 1363 (1984). 
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pens if they do? Waldron must also answer the further questions aris-
ing from his claim that a general right to private property makes sense 
only if everyone has some property. 
Waldron tackles these questions with admirable precision. As 
noted above, he carefully defines a right-based argument as one that 
stresses why an individual's interest is strong enough that others are 
under a duty to respect it (p. 87). One striking feature of this defini-
tion is that Waldron eschews reliance on claims of natural or divine 
right. Thus, Waldron depends upon crafting arguments for individual 
rights that will convince the many to respect the rights of the few or 
the one. He does not, however, address the perplexing issues involving 
the ultimate grounding of an argument for individual rights that ap-
peals - as he seems to - to collective ratification. Consider two pos-
sibilities. The rights proponent may suggest to the group that a 
particular right, e.g., the right to liberty, should be respected either 
because some aspects of life would be better if it were or because rec-
ognition of the right would be consistent with the group's well-recog-
nized allegiance to other ideals. 37 
The first approach threatens a complex justificatory circle. An ar-
gument for a particular right that stresses gains to the right-holder 
remains nonconsequentialist largely because the group's focus is held 
to one right at a time. Thus, we are asked to consider the strength of 
the individual's interest and not how respecting that interest functions 
in maximizing the overall interests of the group. But why should we 
consider only one interest at a time? In other words, how can we de-
cide whether there is a right to liberty without simultaneously consid-
ering how a society that respected liberty would also be able to 
guarantee security and other purported rights? One response is that 
the group can make better decisions by considering one right at a time. 
Again, though, we need to define "better." Ultimately, we need a nor-
mative standard to judge between the utilitarian and rights ap-
proaches, and we find this hard to achieve because rights-analysis and 
utilitarianism constitute the principal justificatory elements we have 
for building normative standards. 
The second approach avoids the problem by appealing to an al-
ready recognized ideal whose justification must itself surmount the dif-
ficulties of the rights tradition. The interesting question here is how 
the proponent of the asserted right argues for "consistency" with the 
pre-established ideal. Ronald Dworkin has perhaps most eloquently 
argued that inconsistent rules often deserve harsh condemnation as 
37. The chosen phrase "some aspects of life" is deliberately ambiguous between some aspects 
of group life and some aspects of the life of the individual who is claiming the right. The former 
definition would suggest that rights are being justified largely in col\sequentialist terms and thus 
run the risk of not being right-based arguments at all. The latter definition seems truer to Wal-
dron's spirit but it raises the problem of crossing from the idea that the individual will gain from 
the right to the idea that the group should actually recognize the right. 
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"checkerboard solutions."38 Consider a rule that a woman born be-
tween January and July has a right to an abortion, but one born be-
tween August and December does not. But· Dworkin has also 
conceded that there are times when decisionmakers may rightly part 
from consistency. Legislatures, for example, may extend a new rule of 
tort liability to one industry before applying it equally to all. 39 The 
problem then is that a theory of consistency alone can't tell us when 
we must be consistent. 
Suppose an opponent of Waldron's suggested right to private prop-
erty agrees that it would be consistent with her idea of liberty to grant 
the property right but that society already has enough liberty and 
should now pursue other values. Waldron might reject her reference 
to the needs of society as unfairly consequentialist. This seems rather 
harsh, however, because consideration of which rights people have 
must ultimately involve reference to the needs of others. After all, 
Waldron's definition wants the right-holder's interest to be strong 
enough so that others are under a duty to respect it. Alternatively, 
Waldron might correctly insist that the property opponent have a 
"principled" reason for giving up on liberty short of granting the argu-
ment for property. But rights theory alone cannot tell us what stan-
dards to use to determine which arguments are principled.40 Here 
again we seek a normative standard to determine when consistency is 
the prime value and when consistency might fairly be sacrificed in 
favor of other goals.41 In short, a full defense or even exploration of a 
right to private property would have to go beyond mere demonstration 
of private property's advantages to property holders. Readers would 
need some clues concerning desirable methods for weighing these ad-
vantages against other values the reader holds equally dear. 
Waldron, however, fairly chooses not to write about every problem 
involved in achieving suitable normative standards. His immediate 
goal is to achieve a definition of rights that is strict enough to distin-
guish rights talk from less individualistic forms of moral argument, 
such a$ utilitarianism. Thus, he sees the emphasis on individual inter-
38. R DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 178-84. 
39. Id. at 217-18. 
40. For a general argument that rights theory is inadequate because it depends upon unar-
gued-for legal and social contexts to give meaning to asserted rights, see Tushnet, supra note 7, at 
1371-80. 
41. The worship of consistency pervades Waldron's entire intellectual effort. He deserves 
praise for demanding that defenders of private property be true to the arguments they raise. 
Thus, Waldron argues that if a particular justification for private property, say personal indepen-
dence, points in the direction of broad equality, then "the logic of justification" (p. 417) forces 
the proponent of the justification either to support equality or abandon the justification. One 
cannot but applaud Waldron's commitment to intellectual integrity while at the same time wish-
ing he would acknowledge the extent to which intellectual consistency is difficult to achieve and 
not necessarily the only test of the good faith of our intellectual opponents. See Boyle, Legal 
Fiction, 38 HAsnNGS L.J. 1013, 1017-19 (1987) (reviewing R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 
(1986)) (criticizing Dworkin for falsely linking consistency with morality, justice and the good). 
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est as distinct from a consequentialist focus on improving general wel-
fare. 42 At the same time, Waldron wants to leave enough flexibility in 
the idea of rights so that rights proponents will not necessarily be tied 
to any particular view of political organization. Accordingly, he dis-
tinguishes the broad category of right-based arguments from more 
narrow claims concerning which rights people are said to have (pp. 62-
63). So, for example, Waldron explains how people may disagree over 
whether there is a right to a minimum income while recognizing that a 
right-based argument for that income would stress an individual's 
strong interest in receiving one. With this distinction, as with the dis-
tinction between concept and conception, Waldron hopes to steer a 
course between skepticism (there are no rights, there is no such thing 
as private property) and absolutism (there is only one set of rights, 
there is only one true definition of property). 
For many readers, Waldron's fine-tuned effort to carve a place for 
rights-based analysis' will constitute a significant contribution. 
Although Waldron explicitly builds on earlier work,43 his clarity and 
common sense present readers with an account of rights arguments 
that captures their individualistic spirit without embracing moral dog-
matism. Waldron explicitly acknowledges, for example, that individ-
ual rights will inevitably conflict and he recognizes that resolution of 
such conflicts will be neither easy nor value-free (p. 77). At the same 
time, Waldron's book does not attempt or achieve a complete theory 
of rights. Readers will wish, for example, that Waldron said more 
about what it is that makes an interest strong enough to place duties 
on others. Readers would also benefit from Waldron's views on what 
types of analysis will resolve rights conflicts. 
C. Property and General Rights 
Ultimately, the most interesting and controversial aspects of Wal-
dron's embrace of rights (aspects that readers may lose sight of during 
the somewhat tedious, early portions of the book) involve Waldron's 
concrete application of his ideas to the problem of private property. 
Waldron argues that if individuals do have a strong enough interest in 
private property to warrant treating private property as a right, then 
every individual has that interest and it cannot be satisfied by a system 
where some people have no property at all. This flows from the fact 
that most of the interests that Waldron asserts might be promoted by 
42. Waldron acknowledges that utilitarianism is itself an individualistic philosophy since its 
goal of maximizing general happiness arises from a desire to maximize the total satisfaction of 
individuals. P. 73. He contends a rights-based approach is still more individualistic, however, 
because it places certain interests of individuals (rights) outside the ordinary calculus and gener· 
ally requires some form of apology, explanation, or repayment to be made to the holder of the 
interest on those occasions when an interest is traded off against another. Pp. 78-79. 
43. Waldron forthrightly acknowledges his debt to Ronald Dworkin (p. 64), Neil Mac· 
Cormick (p. 79), Joseph Raz (pp. 79, 87), and H.L.A. Hart (p. 95). 
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private property, such as the ability to exercise control over the mate-
rial world, won't be satisfied unless the individual actually acquires 
material resources. Moreover, in what is perhaps the book's best 
chapter (pp. 390-422), Waldron convincingly explains why merely 
granting people an opportunity to acquire property will not sufficiently 
answer the egalitarian implications of many right-based arguments. 44 
If people need property to form independent judgments, Waldron 
points out, they need resources, not simply an opportunity to acquire 
them (pp. 414-15). 
Nor does the intuitively strong idea of self-ownership readily trans-
late into a system that protects opportunities while ignoring results. 
Even if one grants that a person is entitled to own herself and her 
talents, Waldron maintains, this says nothing about what sort of social 
structure should be created to govern the reaping of benefits from 
those talents. As Waldron colorfully puts it, self-ownership no more 
entitles a talented mineral prospector the opportunity to ply his trade 
than it would entitle a talented apparatchik the opportunity to con-
tinue living under socialism (p. 407). Accordingly, Waldron con-
cludes, it may be that some arguments support merely the opportunity 
to acquire private property. A pseudo-Social Darwinism, for example, 
might rest on the benefits of stiff competition to individual growth (pp. 
421-22). But the vast majority of arguments supporting private prop-
erty push beyond the point of equality of opportunity to the point 
where the state must make some effort to ensure some equality of out-
come. 45 If people have a right to private property because they need 
44. One particularly nice observation at the beginning of this chapter concerns what Wal-
dron calls the "asymmetrical" character of familiar arguments involving property claims. P. 
390. On one hand, Waldron notes, many take it for granted that the expropriation of tangible 
resources owned by the rich constitutes a violation of the right to private property even if the 
aggrieved person retains the opportunity to acquire additional property. On the other hand, it is 
often assumed that a poor person's rights are satisfied if she retains the opportunity to acquire 
property even if she actually has none. Of course, many explanations may exist for this apparent 
anomaly. Uncompensated expropriations may' be inconsistent with the idea of private property. 
Or, from a consequentialist perspective, expropriation may be seen to defeat the incentive-gener-
ating aspects of a private property system. But Waldron is wholly correct that the chameleon-
like character of opportunity-based arguments is a problem that seldom receives the attention it 
deserves. 
45. In another fine section, Waldron describes the ideal of "equality of opportunity" as un-
stable. Pp. 415-18. He notes that the concerns that lead one to believe people need a good in 
question, for example, education, are unlikely to be satisfied by a system that offers only an 
opportunity to acquire that good. Thus, if we believe people will be more capable citizens if they 
have a certain amount of wealth, we will want them to have that wealth and not merely an 
opportunity to acquire it. 
Waldron recognizes the possibility, however, that government handouts may defeat some of 
the arguments on behalf of private property. If the reason for private property, for example, is to 
encourage a sense of prudence and responsibility, that sense may be thwarted if the government 
is ready to bail out those who squander material resources. P. 419. Thus, Waldron suggests, 
government might be sensitive in its methods of achieving relative distributional equality, es-
chewing handouts in favor of limits on large bequests, efforts to foster home ownership, and 
other alterations of the property framework. P. 420. 
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property to satisfy some strong individual interest, Waldron insists, 
everyone must have some. 
One last problem, however, haunts Waldron's distributional con-
clusions. As he defines it, the concept of private property implies that 
individuals have final say over the resources they own.46 But what 
happens if owners, exercising their final say, choose to transfer re-
sources to others in transactions that result in some persons owning 
less than the minimal amount implied by general rights arguments for 
private property? More concretely, Waldron asks, suppose someone 
loses his shirt in a poker game (p. 423)? How will the legal system 
dedicated to preserving some level of economic equality prevent the 
disruptive transactions (bad bets, poor investments) without destroy-
ing the institution of private property that general rights arguments 
apparently support? Similarly, how can a true system of private prop-
erty prevent accumulations of wealth that result from voluntary trans-
actions? As Robert Nozick asks us, how can a private property system 
stop people from paying Wilt Chamberlain for his basketball talents?47 
Waldron takes this problem very seriously, noting that if the objec-
tion succeeds then the distributional implications of general rights ar-
guments are themselves incoherent.48 In other words, if private 
property necessitates a level of individual control over resources that 
prevents governmental efforts to ensure that everyone has property, 
then the familiar political roadblock to egalitarian claims returns. 
Does it matter that our arguments for private property demand cer-
tain levels of equality, if in practice we can have private property or 
equality but not both? 
Waldron has no definitive answer. Not surprisingly, he invokes 
both of the strategies suggested at the outset of this review. He notes 
first that the concept of private property is one of many conceptions 
and thus there is no logical link between private ownership and abso-
lute right to transfer resources (p. 432). Accordingly, powers of trans-
fer might be qualified by a well-recognized system of taxation designed 
to maintain a wide distribution of property rights (p. 436). Similarly, 
Waldron proposes that certain kinds of transfer simply be defined out 
of the private property concept. Thus, he suggests that a system bar-
46. For obvious limits on the idea of "final say," see supra note 32. 
47. R. NOZICK, supra note 3, at 161. 
48. Pp. 431-32. Waldron discusses both a Nozickian and a Marxian version of the objection 
to the egalitarian implications of general rights arguments for private property. Pp. 42~·31. The 
Marxian claim is that the historical trend toward large-scale enterprises will inevitably cause 
private property systems to concentrate wealth in fewer and fewer hands, leaving the great 
masses of people without the private property that general rights arguments suggest they deserve. 
Waldron correctly notes that extreme versions of this Marxian claim seem to leave no role for 
independent assessment of the justice of present day institutions. On this view, we need simply 
wait for the inevitable progress of history. P. 431. In the meantime, in case Marx was wrong, it 
seems worth considering whether an egalitarian system of private property is conceptually possi-
ble even if it is historically hopeless. 
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ring or trucing certain types of bequests might satisfy the main general 
rights arguments for private property yet substantially eliminate one 
source of inequality (pp. 435-36). Here Waldron makes explicit use of 
the disaggregation of the property concept to argue that the property I 
equality conflict is less severe than it seems. 49 
But Waldron has not left us just where we started. For Waldron 
has made a strong case that private property cannot be well defended 
unless one makes a simultaneous commitment to ensuring that every 
person has substantial resources. Progressive taxation and regulatory 
schemes like rent control are not simply Waldron's idea of how to 
limit the domain of private property. Rather, he views them as neces-
sary to make good on the very justifications for private property that 
he finds persuasive. Taken alone, reliance on progressive taxes threat-
ens to shift the discussion to appropriate taxation levels and risks sac-
rificing the advantages of the frontal assault on nonegalitarian defenses 
of private property. But Waldron wants the focus on taxation to be 
part of the frontal assault. Similarly, efforts to carve up the traditional 
bundle of property rights appear as blatant moves to achieve political 
results, unless one always keeps in mind that each part of that bundle 
must constantly be tested and judged against the background justifica-
tions for the private property system. 
At bottom, it is this insistence on questioning justifications that 
constitutes Waldron's most significant contribution. If it turns out 
that we are persuaded that people have a right to private property to 
facilitate their moral interests as commercial traders, Waldron agrees, 
then we won't want a private property system that places stringent 
limits on the right to transfer one's goods (p. 433). But if, as Waldron 
suspects, our rationales for private property stem more from our inter-
est in allowing people the necessary material resources to develop into 
ethical beings, then Waldron concludes we have an obligation to shape 
our conception of property to ensure that our underlying justification 
is fulfilled. Whether or not Waldron's work is ultimately successful, 
he is certainly correct about that. 
II. THE BURDEN OF RIGHTS-BASED THEORIES 
Although The Right to Private Property reflects extensive knowl-
edge of property theory, it is fair to say that Waldron has not been 
49. Waldron also reminds us that general rights arguments for private property call for rela-
tive, not absolute, equality. Pp. 438-39. If people need private property to help develop moral 
independence, then a system that permits some to have nothing will be untrue to its goals. But 
the fact that some have much more than others won't necessarily defeat the system's underlying 
purpose as long as those at the bottom possess the necessary minimum. Although many progres-
sives will rightly worry that this open-ended qualification may be large enough to permit all but 
the most extreme levels of poverty, see infra text accompanying notes 52-54, Waldron remains 
confident that continual testing of institutions against the justifications underlying the private 
property system will limit inequality to more acceptable bounds. 
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significantly influenced by the legal theorists most skeptical of the idea 
of property rights and rights in general. so As a result, Waldron fails to 
consider some important objections to his approach; objections that 
may dominate many reactions to his overall enterprise. This section 
will explore some of these anticipated objections. Its goal is to avoid 
dismissive criticism of what is a very fine book. The hope instead is 
that sustained investigation of some of the weaknesses within Wal-
dron's writing will enable those inside his tradition and those outside it 
to work more closely together toward the paramount shared goal of 
redressing inequalities endemic to contemporary American life. 
The most predictable objections to Waldron's book are somewhat 
formulaic and can be summarized briefly. It is sometimes said, for 
example, that talk about rights runs the risk of being so abstract as to 
be unable to produce specific political conclusions applicable to the 
real world.s1 Surely this is a problem with a book exploring the right 
to private property that not once comments on the specific resolution 
of a concrete legal dispute. Indeed, Waldron's intellectual framework 
is so jntricate that he fully recognizes that the rights of some impose 
duties on others (p. 87), that rights often conflict (p. 77), and that 
indiv.idual need must qualify claims of right (pp. 439-40). Critics may 
fairly wonder how emphasis on the presence or absence of a right will 
help adjudicate competing claims that arise from this complex frame-
work (e.g., my need for braces against your right to keep a fixed per-
centage of your wages). 
A substantially similar criticism of rights analysis is that its hard 
won conclusions are themselves too indeterminate to be worth the ef-
fort. s2 Waldron, for example, devotes enormous energy to demon-
strating that if there is a right to private property then everyone has a 
right to a certain minimum amount of property. But how much is the 
minimum? Is it defined in relative or absolute terms? Do egalitarian 
concerns vanish once the minimum is reached? How will a guaran-
teed minimum help resolve concrete disputes? To what extent, for ex-
ample, does society have an obligation to provide resources above the 
minimum to handicapped individuals who require special medical 
equipment? 
50. No suggestion is made here that Waldron is biased in his choice of significant authors. 
He devotes extensive energy to the works of Robert Nozick and Karl Marx, John Locke and 
G.W.F. Hegel, John Rawls and Wesley Hohfeld. Waldron chooses not to consider, however, the 
critical legal studies challenge to talk of property rights or certain of its realist forbearers. See, 
e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 18, at 36-38 (criticizing liberal version of rights and naming property 
rights as prototypical); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. 
REv. 205 (1979) (describing the apologetic role of rights discourse within liberal theory); Singer, 
supra note 4, at 632-63 (criticizing liberal vision of property rights); Cohen, Dialogue on Private 
Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357 (1954); Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 
(1927). 
51. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1375. 
52. Id. at 1371-82. 
May 1990] Can Rights Move Left? 1645 
Waldron believes the trajectory of our arguments for private prop-
erty can help determine the necessary minimum level. So, for exam-
ple, if private property is adopted as a means of ensuring individuals a . 
degree of independence, then each person must have enough so as to 
be sufficiently independent. The complexities here, however, may be 
overwhelming. 53 How much does one need to be independent? Am I 
more or less independent if I know that if I waste what I have I will 
receive new supplies? If the poorest people in well-developed nations 
have more than almost everyone in less-developed nations, should the 
focus of richer governments be on internal redistribution or foreign 
aid? The point is not that consensus around an idea of a minimum 
doesn't advance debate. Rather the fear is that it doesn't advance it 
far enough. 54 
Still another frequent objection to rights analysis stems from its 
perceived over-emphasis on the individual. 55 One concern is that defi-
nitions of rights, like Waldron's, that focus on individual interests are 
too likely to overlook the importance of group processes in social life. 
This objection may take an ethical turn. Thus, the premium placed on 
individual values, such as the independence, prudence, and self-asser-
tion that Waldron offers as supporting private property, may be de-
scribed as obscuring other equally important values like fraternity and 
community. Or the objection may take a psychological turn, focusing 
on the extent to which individual interests cannot be separated from 
group acculturation. These objections remind us that Waldron should 
have attempted more explicitly to defend his decision to write solely 
about avowedly individualistic approaches to property theory. 
The short shrift Waldron gives to the overwhelming contemporary 
importance of corporate ownership perhaps best illustrates Waldron's 
overzealous commitment to individualistic theories. Waldron asks the 
reader to consider Western-style corporate ownership as an outgrowth 
or "mutation" of private property (p. 57) rather than a form of owner-
ship in its own right. 56 He argues that corporate ownership often 
arises as a result of private initiatives undertaken to fulfill the purposes 
S3. I am grateful to my colleague Jim Lindgren for stressing to me the difficulties in defining 
a minimum level of wealth or income. 
S4. Nor is this purely a theoretical concern. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's 
argument in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), rejecting a chal-
lenge to the funding method for Texas schools. As long as Texas provided each student the 
necessary minimum education, the Court held, there was no constitutional violation in a funding 
scheme that permitted the most afiluent district to spend $S94 per pupil each year while the 
poorest had only $3S6 per student. 
SS. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 60-6S, 147-S2, 173-74 
(1982) (criticizing deontological theories for overemphasizing justice and individual rights at the 
expense of a more constitutive sense of community); Lynd, supra note 7, at 1418-22 (attempting 
to rescue concept of rights from its traditionally individualistic origins). 
S6. Waldron recognizes that corporate ownership can also form part of a collective property 
system when the state assumes the corporate form for purposes of resource control. Pp. S8-S9. 
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of private individuals. Moreover, he notes that property law analo-
gizes the corporate owner to an individual owner for purposes of 
granting the corporation final say over use of the owned resource (p. 
58). 
The initial question here is why recognition of corporate ownership 
doesn't threaten the very existence of private property as an "organiz-
ing idea."57 Why, in other words, aren't the rules regulating corporate 
governance more fundamental to the society than any rules of private 
property? Certainly, this can't be because corporations own insignifi-
cant amounts of property. More likely, it's because theories like Wal-
dron's are reluctant to give up on the idea of the primacy of the 
individual. 
Still more important, readers are likely to wonder why the relent-
less examination of justifications that characterizes Waldron's book is 
not also applied to the question of corporate ownership. If private 
property is to be justified by the individual's need for economic inde-
pendence, can corporate ownership really be justified in the same way? 
Waldron's characterization of corporate ownership as simply part of a 
private property system spares him the need to address this question. 
But it also gives his book the appearance of taking on the abstract 
issue of a minimum income without confronting one real source of 
concentrated economic power in America. After all, the Right to Pri-
vate Property purports to be an in-depth exploration of the strengths 
and weaknesses of arguments for a right to private property. It would 
have been better had Waldron considered all of these stock 
objections. 58 
Above all, however, the most serious shortcomings of Waldron's 
book involve two additional points central to the heart of his enter-
prise. First, the argument Waldron uses to criticize special rights ar-
guments for private property has considerable bite against the general 
rights arguments he wishes at least preliminarily to defend. Thus, 
Waldron needs to explain more fully his sympathy for the general 
rights approach. Second, Waldron's attack on special rights argu-
ments too quickly minimizes the principal way in which special rights 
arguments are superior to general rights arguments. Special rights ar-
guments not only advance the idea that individuals have a right to 
private property, but also offer an approach for determining who has a 
right to what. General rights arguments do not. Accordingly, the 
careless shifting back and forth between special rights arguments and 
general rights arguments that Waldron correctly labels a "fraudulent 
eclecticism" (p. 444) may also be a structural necessity. If this is so, 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 25-35. 
58. For an innovative attempt to reinvigorate rights analysis that considers and responds to 
these objections, see Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive 
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1105, 1224-34 (1989). 
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Waldron will encounter serious difficulty in rescuing the concept of 
private property from the force of his own critique. 
A. Can Rights Be General? 
Waldron's attack on special rights arguments for private property 
rests on a simple and powerful premise. The unilateral actions of one 
citizen should not be able to place duties upon other citizens, particu-
larly when those duties might involve significant sacrifice. Thus, it 
would be all well and good if my appropriation of unowned land cre-
ated a special relationship between me and the land. But for me to 
own the land I would need a special relationship with others who can 
no longer use it now that I have been designated the owner. The key 
to this relationship, however, cannot be based only on what I have 
done. In Waldron's view, it must arise either from actual or hypothet-
ical agreements between me and my fellow citizens. 
The problem is that a structurally analogous challenge applies to 
general rights arguments as well. After all, Waldron's definition of all 
rights-based arguments asks us to examine whether the strength of an 
individual interest warrants imposing a duty on one's neighbors to 
protect it. But, if the unilateral actions of one citizen cannot impose 
duties on others, it is fair to ask whether the unilateral interests or 
needs of the individual can do so. In other words, no matter how 
strong my interest in having private property, we can only cross the 
barrier that converts interest to right after saying something about the 
character of the interest that makes it fair to require others to respect 
it. But Waldron never satisfactorily explains what that is. Nor would 
that task be a simple one. 
The underlying dilemma Waldron faces is how to give enough con-
tent to the asserted set of rights so that the theory differs markedly 
from utilitarian and communitarian approaches, while at the same 
time not building in a particular set of rights that render the theory 
subject to the charge that, like special rights theories, it merely pro-
tects unilateral expectations. As the phrase general rights implies, 
Waldron's answer is based on universalization. Thus, when Waldron 
speaks of rights, he never really means the concrete rights of an indi-
vidual derived from her unique circumstances. My need for a seeing-
eye dog, for example, could never place my neighbors under a duty to 
provide me with one. My particularized need is, after all, unilateral. I 
might still have a right to the dog, however, if I can redescribe my 
need in terms that apply generally to all. Thus, I can argue that every-
one has an interest in unrestrained locomotion and that interest is 
strong enough that others should respect and defend it. 59 The crucial 
59. Another familiar weakness of rights theory is that it appears to offer little guidance for 
identifying the proper level of generality applicable to a given dispute. How are we to know, for 
example, whether we should see proposals for governmentally supplied seeing-eye dogs as efforts 
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question is whether the resort to generalization substantially undercuts 
Waldron's defense of the rights approach. 
Waldron argues at the outset that rights theory is preferable to 
utilitarianism because rights theory makes it more difficult to justify 
trade-offs whereby one person would suffer (perhaps unjustly or with-
out cause) so that others might benefit (pp. 77-79). This argument 
works well in the case of special rights arguments. The right-holder 
takes unilateral actions and becomes entitled by virtue of the special 
rights theory to block claims of his fellows that would interfere with 
enjoyment of the special right. Thus, individual claims (just ones 
where the special rights theory succeeds) prevail over demands of the 
collective. The cost, however, is that those injured by invocation of a 
special right must respect that right even where they played no part in 
creating it and even when its application causes them significant harm. 
Waldron, perhaps wisely, is unwilling to pay this price. 
Instead, Waldron wants to appeal to rights that through the force 
of argument will apply to and thus command the respect of everyone. 
It is much more difficult, however, to understand how general rights 
arguments operate to weaken Waldron's feared demands of the collec-
tive. For the question here is never really whether an individual has a 
right to something like property but instead whether every individual 
has that right. And, how are we to decide whether every individual 
has a particular right without a detailed understanding of what it 
would cost every individual to respect that right?60 Waldron is correct 
that once the right is recognized general rights theories will function 
differently from straightforward utilitarian approaches. 61 A right may 
be respected even when its invocation will obviously cause others to 
suffer and perhaps even when long-run overall suffering will exceed 
overall gains that the right generates. But the problem with general 
rights arguments arises before the question of application. The trick is 
in deciding what general rights there are. 
Consider, for example, the hypothetical citizen (of whom Waldron 
seems so fond) sitting down to decide whether there is a general right 
to life. She would presumably agree that each individual has a very 
strong interest in living. But does this interest rise to the level of right? 
To answer this question our imagined citizen must think carefully 
to afford blind people the same right to locomotion as sighted people or as altruistic endeavors to 
provide the blind, however deserving, with special privileges? See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1372-
73 (criticizing rights theory for permitting advocates to manipulate outcomes by focusing on the 
level of generality consistent with a desired result). 
60. We might ask whether from a moral perspective the duty-holders are themselves obli-
gated to respect the asserted right. In Waldron's terms, however, theories that focus on the 
moral situation of the duty holders are duty-based, not right-based, theories. Pp. 68-73. 
61. As Waldron recognizes, it is perfectly plausible to incorporate respect for individual 
rights as part of a utilitarian analysis. Waldron, however, fears that such respect will never go 
deep enough if the existence of the right must always be justified in utilitarian terms. Pp. 12-13. 
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about what the duty-holders will be sacrificing in agreeing to respect 
the right to life. After all, it is because the sacrifice might be too great 
that Waldron rejects special rights arguments for private property that 
might leave the duty-holders without moral grounds to use resources 
they need to survive. 
Acknowledging a right to life, however, might indeed place signifi-
cant duties on everyone. We all might need to work hard to support 
the sophisticated medical equipment needed to save severely damaged 
premature infants. How are we to decide whether individuals have an 
obligation to take on this burden? And, if we decide against at least 
this conception of a right to life, won't we imagine the damaged new-
born to feel as though trade-offs between the group and individuals are 
being made too easily?62 
Waldron might object that the whole point of the general rights 
approach is that the question of whether a general right to life exists is 
considered not from the standpoint of the group but from the stand-
point of the representative individual. Thus, the baby's right to neces-
sary medical care won't be denied merely because of the accumulation 
of small benefits to many others, but because a representative individ-
ual would conclude that the interest in medical care is not strong 
enough to place representative individuals under a duty to provide it. 
Presumably, this judgment will include imagining herself as the dam-
aged infant as well as thinking about what it would cost the average 
citizen in hours spent to provide the necessary equipment. 
A case can be made, however, that in many respects the judgments 
of the representative individual will function to frustrate the real-life 
individual in the same way as the demands of the group. For almost 
by definition, the representative individual can consider only those as-
pects of human life that individuals have in common.63 This is why, 
for example, success at rights rhetoric always requires translation of 
an individualistic claim, like an asserted right to wear a skull cap, into 
a universal claim, like the right to practice one's religion.64 It is also 
why an asserted right unique to the experience of a particular individ-
62. The selection of a so-called positive right that would require the duty holders to affirma-
tively aid (as opposed to merely not hindering) the right holder may seem to stack the deck. 
Precisely the same analysis, however, applies to more traditional negative rights. Even if the 
right to life, for example, is conceived of as the right not to be killed, the imaginary citizen must 
still consider the costs of living a life in which he cannot murder to gain what he needs. These 
costs may appear trivial ifthe imagined society is a just one. Would economically disadvantaged 
parents of a severely deformed infant, however, be sure they would want to grant a right to life in 
a country where they were forbidden from having more than one child and the economic contri-
butions of their child were their best hope to escape abject poverty? 
63. For extended discussion of this idea focusing on the danger that abstract concepts like 
"the representative individual" will deny conflicting experiences, such as those between men and 
women, see Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Femi-
nist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986). 
64. There is, of course, no guarantee that the minority will be able to persuade the majority 
that its idiosyncratic practices deserve constitutional protection. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 
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ual or group won't fit well under the rubric of general rights. Thus, 
general rights theories have work to do in presenting themselves as 
individualistic improvements to utilitarianism. 
At the same time, the demand for universalism within rights the-
ory is not necessarily mistaken. It protects against efforts to parade 
idiosyncratic needs under the rights banner. Thus, universalism ex-
plains the power of Waldron's critique of special rights property theo-
ries that seek to transform the unilateral actions of one into duties on 
others. Once one takes the demands of universalism seriously, how-
ever, it becomes increasingly difficult to draft a theory aimed at plac-
ing the rights of the individual above the interests of the collective. 
For nothing the individual has ever done or experienced can count in 
determining what her rights are. Yet if this is so, how can we really 
know which of her interests are strong enough that others are under a 
duty to respect them? In the end, the difficulty of answering that ques-
tion renders the general rights approach highly problematic. If Wal-
dron's enterprise is to succeed he needs to tell us much more about 
how we cross the barrier from strong interest to right. He needs to 
explain why strong individual interests don't have the same unilateral 
character as the conditional actions he forcefully argues cannot create 
special rights to private property. 
B. Fraudulent Eclecticism, Structural Necessity, or Both? 
Waldron's stinging criticism of special rights theories further adds 
to the difficulty of giving content to a so-called general right to private 
property. A special rights theory might tell us not only that people . 
should own a certain amount of property to achieve economic inde-
pendence but that I should own Blackacre because I have labored 
upon it. The best we can expect, however, from a theory that merely 
says it's a good idea for some people to own some things is a bit of 
guidance away from purely collective or common property systems. 
But since even the staunchest opponents of private property would 
probably grant that personal items (like toothbrushes) are best owned 
by individuals, we are eventually going to have to get past general con-
siderations into specific debates like which goods should be privately 
owned and what principles should govern use, exclusion, and transfer. 
Many things could be said about these questions, but few will doubt 
that they are difficult and, more important, controversial. Any 
worked out system of property law will need a mechanism for address-
ing these problems. 
The ideological goal of private property's more conservative de-
fenders is to settle property law's difficult questions with one grand 
:flourish. Thus, once it is decided that I own Blackacre, all the issues 
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Air Force regulation that barred Jewish 
serviceman from wearing a yarmulke on duty). 
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of use, exclusion, and transfer are said to fall into place as a result of 
the (usually broad) definition of ownership.65 It is much to Waldron's 
credit that he thoroughly refutes any such simplistic solutions. He 
demonstrates how ownership can mean many different things, and in 
doing so, he brings again to the surface the deep-seated political con-
troversies involved in establishing societal ground rules governing pri-
vate control over resources. But how are these controversies to be 
resolved? 
It is here that the rhetorical advantages of special rights theories to 
private property systems are most easily seen. For the hope of a spe-
cial rights theory is that the same underlying justification that estab-
lished the desirability of private ownership will also come into play in 
resolving concrete property law issues. Thus, if I am to be rewarded 
for my labor in enclosing unowned land, special rights theories will 
require special reasons to adopt rules that would limit my reward by 
restricting my ability to transfer that land.66 More generally, special 
rights theories hope to reduce property law disputes to the small 
number of issues suggested in the work of Robert Nozick. Did the 
claimant acquire the resource in accord with the principles of just ac-
quisition and just transfer set forth in the special rights theory? If so, 
then the claimant is the owner, and the hope is that this will settle a 
great number of disputes. 
Waldron effectively demonstrates, however, that the grand hope of 
special rights theories is in fact a vain one. Beyond the obvious 
problems in applying even the clearest special rights theory (what, for 
example, counts as first possession?),67 Waldron shows both that the 
justifications for special rights theories are themselves questionable 
and that no serious work has been done to link special rights claims to 
ownership with special rights claims to a power of unlimited transfer 
(pp. 260-61 ). 
But without special rights theories, how can a functioning property 
system settle the day-to-day issues of property law? To what "or-
ganizing idea" will legal decisionmakers appeal in determining 
whether I may come onto your land to confer with migrant workers 
living there? Waldron's work suggests two answers. First, like special 
rights theories, general rights theories may themselves suggest under-
lying justifications that will point to specific resolutions of property 
issues. Second, the independent value of adhering to preexisting rules 
65. See Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970, 971 (1985) ("To the 
person who thinks of rights as being acquired by first possession, the right of alienation seems to 
be an inescapable element of the original bundle of property rights."). 
66. Id. at 973-90 (suggesting that restraints on alienation are justified when necessary to 
prevent misuse of resources like guns or to prevent overexploitation of resources owned by com-
mon pool). 
67. See Paul, supra note 3, at 757-65 (criticizing first possession as a useful tool for resolving 
property disputes). 
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may allow many property questions to be settled by convention. Sub-
sequent disputes may then be settled simply by appealing to those con-
ventions. Neither of these approaches, however, has the ideological 
power of special rights theories. Nor can either function effectively as 
the sole conceptual basis for a private property system. 
The underlying justifications for a general right to property are 
simply too vague to provide guidance for a wholesale set of property 
rules. It is easy to see that a general rights-based theory might support 
restrictions of the right to bequeath large estates, if the rationale for 
private property suggests everyone should have some property and the 
predicted effects of large bequests is that some people will have noth-
ing. Beyond that, however, the mere idea that everyone should have 
some undefined minimum amount of property will tell us almost noth-
ing about what rules to adopt. And, so long as there is no perceived 
threat to the minimum, legal decision makers attempting to resolve 
concrete disputes (e.g., what sorts of restraints on alienation should 
there be) will have no underlying theory of property on which to rely. 
Moreover, as Waldron reminds us, these decisionmakers "need not 
1 
be upset by every fluctuation in the relative wealth and fortunes of 
individuals. What they will be on the lookout for will be tendencies 
towards the accumulation of enormous holdings, particularly of capi-
tal resources, on the one hand, and the accompanying development of 
long-term propertylessness, on the other" (p. 439). A great deal of 
inequality may thus arise before decisionmakers must leave the life-
guard's chair. More important, the general right to private property 
will so vastly underdetermine the society's rules governing control 
over resources that some other principles will be needed for deciding 
concrete cases. Waldron may be successful in confining these other 
principles so that they can be trumped by considerations stemming 
from the general right. Thus, society may decide to permit bequests to 
reward savings but not permit the "reward savings" rationale to apply 
where that would interfere with the implications of the general rights 
theory. But even then, progressives concerned with wealth distribu-
tion will want to know how far each principle will extend before being 
persuaded that Waldron has successfully broken the link between pri-
vate property and inequality. 
Waldron further reminds us that the day-to-day rules of the prop-
erty system may initially be drafted to correspond to notions of a gen-
eral right to private property but that the rules may then be appealed 
to on grounds relating largely to consistency and citizen expectations. 
In other words, if the society adopts rules largely permitting transfer 
of resources, Waldron suggests it may not then prohibit a particular 
transfer simply to reflect a changed attitude toward that transfer. In-
deed, perhaps government cannot act even if it now views a ban on 
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transfers as a necessary implication of a general right to private 
property. 
But the effort to rely on citizens' expectations as an organizing idea 
to replace special rights theories underestimates the extent to which a 
primary role of government is to change property rules in ways that 
disrupt expectations. Government, for example, may routinely change 
the speed limit in ways that restrict the use I can make of my resources 
even if I made a large investment (purchased a trucking company?) 
based on the old rules. Only occasionally will such disruptions of ex-
pectations be so severe as to violate constitutional protections for 
property. The point, however, is that something :i;nore than consis- . 
tency must provide the "organizing idea" for shaping citizens' expec- . 
tations. Special rights theories provide the illusion of accomplishing 
this task by linking the origin of the property right to its content. In 
short, special rights theories help specify who owns what. In contrast, 
general rights theories will have a difficult time serving as a guide to 
citizen expectations because they are simply too imprecise. 
None of this is to suggest that the institution of private property 
absolutely requires allegiance to special rights theories. Indeed, after 
Waldron's work it will become increasingly difficult to defend a special 
rights approach to private property. Rather, the point Waldron's 
book fails fully to consider is that special rights theories provide much 
of the content for what Waldron refers to as our "organizing idea" of 
private property. Absent special rights theories we may still want to 
argue for individualized control over resources. But even the most 
trivial dispute between two individuals for the same resource will pose 
a test to our general rights theory. If I need braces and you want to 
take a vacation, what does a general rights theory say about whether 
you should be taxed to help me out? Does it say enough that it is still 
fair to call your ownership of your wages private property? These 
questions lie at the root of Waldron's imaginative effort to consider 
private property as one of the general rights of men and women. 
III. WHERE WE STAND 
In The Right to Private Property, Waldron has demonstrated that 
the rights tradition is capable of producing trenchant criticisms of con-
servative ideology. He has also shown that there is no necessary con-
nection between allegiance to private property and a commitment to 
substantial inequality. His work thus constitutes a cogent reminder 
that, if pushed hard enough, the premises of individualistic theories 
may produce conclusions similar to those advocated by more commu-
nitarian thinkers. Waldron pushes these premises very hard indeed. 
At the same time, exhaustive as it may be, Waldron's book only 
begins to study the hard questions remaining once special rights theo-
ries for private property have been definitively rejected. The notion of 
1654 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1622 
a general right to private property is highly unstable once one aban-
dons traditional labor theories and theories of first possession. It is not 
clear precisely how one determines what general rights there are, nor 
is it clear what rules one adopts after settling on a scheme of general 
rights. Waldron would be more sensitive to the instability of general 
rights if he gave greater credence to the well-developed criticisms of 
the rights tradition. Perhaps in the future he will afford these critiques 
the respect that he has certainly earned from all of us. 
